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HLD-013(October 2010)   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 10-3060 & 10-3421 
___________ 
 
LOUIS SINGLETON, JR., 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
DA PHILADELPHIA; MAYOR MICHAEL NUTTER, City of Philadelphia; 
MR. CHARLES RAMSEY, Police Commissioner; MR. MAURIZIO, Detectives #604 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-05148) 
District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal due to a Jurisdictional Defect and 
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 29, 2010 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
  (Opinion filed February 14, 2011)      
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 Appellant Louis Singleton, Jr., who is proceeding pro se, seeks review of 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s dismissal of his 
complaint.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the district court’s 
judgment. 
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I. 
 On April 7, 2010, Singleton filed an application to proceed in forma 
pauperis as well as a proposed complaint against Detective Matthew Maurizio, 
Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey, Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter, 
Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham, and an unknown police detective.  He 
claimed that, on March 3, 2006, he was assaulted by Maurizio and his partner, and was 
subject to false charges for burglary.  Singleton did not make any specific allegations as 
to Nutter, Ramsey, or Abraham.  As relief, Singleton sought dental work, payment of his 
medical expenses, and compensation for pain and suffering.  On April 14th, the district 
court entered an order granting Singleton’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and 
directed that the complaint be filed.   The district court also screened the complaint under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed Abraham and Nutter from the action.  Construing 
the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court determined 
that Abraham was shielded from suit by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, and that 
Singleton did not include any allegations that would allow it to find that Abraham or 
Nutter deprived Singleton of his civil rights.    
 Defendants Ramsey and Maurizio thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Singleton’s 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that, as to defendant Ramsey, 
Singleton failed to allege any personal involvement in the alleged assault.  Singleton did 
not respond to the motion.  The district court granted the motion to dismiss and further 
ordered that the complaint was dismissed with prejudice based on the statute of 
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limitations.  In making this decision, the district court also determined that equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations was not appropriate.  
 Singleton now appeals.   
II. 
 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will 
summarily affirm the district court’s judgment because no substantial issues are presented 
by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred.  
Singleton’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.  
See Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that there is a two-
year statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Pennsylvania); 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 5524.  The alleged assault of which Singleton complains occurred on March 
3, 2006.  Because there is no doubt that Singleton was immediately aware of his injury, 
his §1983 claim accrued on the same day.  See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of 
Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).  Thus, the statute of limitations expired on 
March 3, 2008, two years before he filed his complaint.  Further, to the extent that 
Singleton attempts to set forth a false arrest claim, that claim also accrued on March 3, 
2006, the date that he states he was arrested and charges were filed against him.  See 
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007) (“[T]he statute of limitations upon a § 1983 
claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the 
arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes 
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detained pursuant to legal process.”).  See also Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 
F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 In support of his appeal, Singleton asserts that the statute of limitations 
should be equitably tolled because, before October 2008, he was in a work release 
program where did not have access to a law library and could not obtain the information 
necessary for filing this lawsuit.  He does not explain why he waited until April 2010 to 
file his lawsuit other than stating that “somehow the chain of events have . . . been broken 
since [his] initial filing” in October 2008.  Equitable tolling is extraordinary relief, and is 
appropriate only when:  (1) a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff regarding his or her 
cause of action; (2) a plaintiff has been prevented from asserting a claim as a result of 
other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) a plaintiff has timely asserted his or her claim in 
the wrong forum.  Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000).  None of these 
circumstances is present in this case.   
 Further, the district court’s decision to dismiss Abraham and Nutter from 
the action was not erroneous.  It is unclear why Singleton named Abraham as a 
defendant, who would, of course, be entitled to immunity for decisions made in her 
official role.  In any event, the district court also appropriately determined that Singleton 
did not set forth any allegations that would allow it to find that Abraham and Nutter 
personally participated in the deprivation of Singleton’s constitutional rights.  Nor do we 
see any way that Singleton might have amended his complaint to state a viable claim 
against any named defendant.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  As the district 
5 
 
court’s August 4th order explained, granting leave to amend would be futile because “the 
litigation of this case would be time-barred.”   
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no 
substantial question,” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6, and will thus summarily affirm the district 
court’s judgment.  Singleton’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  
